The great American writer William Faulkner in his unique literary voice wrote of Pickett’s charge in his novel Intruder in the Dust and tells us the whole South wanted and still wants to be there at Gettysburg on the 3 July 1863:
‘…the brigades are in position behind the rail fence, the guns are laid and ready in the woods and the furled flags are already loosened to break out and Pickett himself, with his long oiled ringlets and his hat in one hand probably, and his sword in the other looking up the hill waiting for Longstreet to give the word it’s all in the balance, it hasn’t happened yet. It hasn’t even begun yet there is still time for it not to begin against that position and those circumstance which made more men than Garnett and Kemper and Armistead and Wilcox (brigade commanders) look grave yet it’s going to begin, we all know that, we have come too far with too much at stake…’
Why then did Robert E. Lee launch this desperate attack on the third day of the battle of Gettysburg given he is one of the greatest commanders of military history.
Of course the battle was not started by Lee but one of his divisional commanders Harry Heth, of the third Confederate Infantry Corps commanded by A. P. Hill, indeed only days before Lee had ordered all his commanders to avoid contact with the enemy. On 30 June, James Pettigrew’s Brigade of Heth’s command had approached Gettysburg but, observing Union Cavalry, had withdrawn. Heth on 1 July blundered into Gettysburg ignoring these earlier reports. Some say in search of shoes, yet given that Richard Ewell’s second corps had passed through the town days before this is unlikely. Heth was new to commanding a division as was his Corps commander Hill; both men seemed to have been unaware of their position.
Heth’s men ran into John Buford’s dismounted Federal Cavalry and got into quite a hot fight. Buford hung on while Heth brought up the rest of his men. Before he could deploy these to attack, elements of the Federal 1st Infantry Corps had pitched in so Heth found himself in an even bigger fight. The Confederate guerrilla fighter Major John S. Mosby felt both Heth and Hill thought they could ‘…bag a few thousand Yankees…’ and ‘present them to General Lee that evening.’ But ‘…they bit off more than they could chew.’ Especially when elements of the Federal 1st Corps arrived to support Buford’s Cavalry. Lee arrives on the field and calls off the attack confiding to General Richard H. Anderson his lack of intelligence and that he had not heard from JEB Stuart and that he was ‘…in ignorance as to what we have in front of us.’
Yet like most great events the battle dictates otherwise, word arrives that Robert Rode’s division of Ewell’s 2nd Corps is attacking the Federals from the north and Jubal Early’s division of the same Corps is nearby. Observing the collapse of the Federal right Lee reverses his decision and orders the attack to continue. But they only succeed in driving the Federal’s back, albeit in some disorder onto stronger positions on Cemetery Hill and Ridge. Lee sends discretionary orders to Ewell to take the high ground south of Gettysburg to ‘press these people’; his aid Walter Taylor delivered the message with the proviso ‘if practicable.’ Ewell is not used to Lee, Thomas Jonathan (Stonewall) Jackson, who he had served under, sent clear orders. It may have been the case Taylor was not forceful enough in his delivery of the message as he had great admiration for Ewell. Whatever happened Ewell hesitated and the opportunity was gone.
Worse was to follow, Lee tries to shorten his line, a good move, by ordering Ewell to move to his right, behind Hill, forming the line further south with Longstreet filling in on the extreme right. However now Ewell thinks he can take the hills in the morning. Why he thought this is hard to say with a steady stream of Federal Troops arriving on the field. But Lee compounds the error by allowing him to try.
The night of 1 July consists mainly of a strange argument or battle of wills between Lee and James Longstreet, the opinionated but skilful commander of the First Corps, over the battle plan. Lee wanted to maintain the offensive with Longstreet attacking the far left of the Union line with his corps while Ewell attacked the right. Whereas Longstreet, who was for Lee his most trusted subordinate, felt the entire army should disengage and move around to the left of the Federals, a sort of side step, placing them between Washington and the Army of the Potomac, thus forcing the men in blue to attack them on better ground.
Lee feels with a large part of his cavalry still missing under JEB Stuart, he cannot move blindly about. He orders Ewell and Longstreet to attack early in the morning. Ewell is to wait until he hears Longstreet’s guns before going in.
Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur Fremantle was a British observer of the battle although not in any official capacity. He went with Longstreet that night back to his headquarters at Cashtown. They passed Confederate troops ‘…pouring along the road, and were being marched toward the positions they will occupy tomorrow.’ He finds the staff at the camp full of contempt for the enemy but Longstreet is not so sure. He talks of the enemy’s position as being ‘formidable,’ and concluded they would improve their positions during the night.
The next day Ewell’s attack on the right of the Federal line soon disintegrates in chaos. On the left two of Longstreet’s divisions, those of John Bell Hood and Lafayette McLaws go in. Here, by luck, the attack is devastating because as McLaws moves forward, Daniel Sickles, commanding the Federal third corps decides to move his men forward out of line with the rest of the line. Thus it takes several Federal Divisions to restore the line. This may have influenced Lee that Longstreet had come close to cracking the Federal line. It appears Longstreet’s attack was committed badly; his divisions had gone forward with no relation to each other. The attack had been made much later than Lee wanted. Indeed, many believe Longstreet should not have committed his men, but returned to Lee, informing him the situation Lee had hoped to exploit in the morning no longer existed. Was he still sulking because Lee had not taken his advice?
Yet what happened the next day, 3 July seems mostly down to Lee. He ordered the attack. Standing by the imposing Virginia State Memorial, topped by a statue of Robert E. Lee on Seminary Ridge, all within the Gettysburg National Military Park. Why did he attack here across this mile wide valley in the open? He admits himself he thought his infantry were invincible and they would succeed if enough of them were totally committed properly in the attack. It was a desperate thing that had a chance. But this assault, too, was misdirected and has gone down in history as Pickett’s Charge, named after George Edward Pickett, whose division made up half the attacking force. Of the 15,000 who took part, barely a third survived.
The British observer of the battle of Gettysburg Colonel Arthur Lyon Fremantle’s book Three Months in the Southern States was published in 1864 and became a best seller, it was later retitled The Fremantle Diary. Fremantle rose to the rank of General and in command of the Brigade of Guards took part in the battle of Tamai 13 March 1884 in the Sudan two Victoria Crosses were awarded during the action. Fremantle ended his career as Governor of Malta 1894-1899.
Fremantle witnessed much of this although quite understandably he was not sure what had happened until he met Longstreet and remarked to the general that he felt privileged to be there: ‘Longstreet was seated at the top of a snake fence at the edge of the wood, and looking perfectly calm and unperturbed. He replied, laughing. “The devil you wouldn’t I would like to have missed it very much; we’ve attacked and have been repulsed look there.” It was the first time he had seen the open ground between the two positions and saw ‘…it covered with Confederates slowly and sulkily returning towards us in small broken parties, under a heavy fire of artillery.’
I do not mention the Federals much; who Lee called ‘those people’, merely because after getting away with a bad situation on the first day, they merely stood on the high ground on the defensive. Of course General George Meade was new to command, only being appointed to command the army on 27 June. Avoiding defeat on the first day he was happy to hang on.
President Lincoln was not happy. He felt Meade should have attacked on the third or fourth and wrote a letter of reprimand, but having cooled down, and on reflection, he realised what Meade had done; he had deflected the last real, slim chance the South had to win independence on the battlefield. The letter was never sent.
Gettysburg does not make Lee a bad commander, he knew from the start it was a long shot, and he failed here largely for the same reasons he triumphed in other battles. He gave his commanders plenty of discretion. At Gettysburg most of them let him down, JEB Stuart and his cavalry that missed the first two days, although Lee had other cavalry units that could have been used to better effect. A. P. Hill and Harry Heth who got sucked into a battle against Lee’s orders to avoid contact and Richard Ewell who missed the opportunity to capture the high ground of Cemetery Ridge on the first day. And there was Longstreet who did give him sound advice but was slow to carry out orders.
Would Thomas Jonathan (Stonewall) Jackson have made a difference had he lived? A brilliant tactician, he must surely have taken Cemetery Hill on 1 July and the battle is completely different of course this is mere speculation.
The Confederate Roll of Honour was instigated in 1862 to ‘bestow medals’ on the soldiers of the Confederate States. Delays in obtaining medals led to the creation of the Roll, the war ended before any awards were made.
The Sons of the Confederate Veterans in 1977 created the Confederate Medal of Honour as a posthumous award. The medal is in bronze and silver, with a five pointed star overlain. Inscribed with the words ‘Honour, Duty, Valour, Devotion.’ In the centre is the Great Seal of the Confederate States.
Four have been awarded for actions during the battle of Gettysburg. To Brigadier General Wade Hampton for his actions on 3 July leading a Confederate attack already having received a sabre wound he suffered two more during this action but continued to lead his men. Brigadier General Richard Garnett was killed during Pickett’s charge on 3 July, although suffering from a fever and an injured leg he insisted on leading his brigade on horseback, which made him a conspicuous target despite the objections of several other officers. Colonel Henry King Burgwyn commanding officer of the 26th North Carolina was killed on 1 July cresting Macpherson’s Ridge carrying the colours of the Regiment. In all thirteen colour bearers of the 26th were either killed or wounded that day. Private James L. Akers of the 2nd Mississippi Infantry, by the time the regiment took part in Pickett’s Charge it was down to just sixty men only one would come back. Akers was last seen crossing the stone wall before he was shot down.
Sixty-two Medals of Honour were awarded to Federal Soldiers for the battle of Gettysburg. One of the most famous awarded to Colonel Joshua L. Chamberlain commanding officer of the 20th Maine for his actions on 2 July the citation reads ‘…for daring heroism and great tenacity in holding his position on the Little Round Top against repeated assaults, and carrying the advanced position on the Great Round Top.’
The United States Medal of Honour came into being during the American Civil War being first awarded on 25 March 1863 to Private Jacob Parrott for his part during the raid on a Confederate train in Big Shanty Georgia.