Battle for the Narrows
Assault from the Sea
‘I had a most indelible impression that we were in the presence of a beaten foe. I thought he was beaten at 2 p.m. I knew he was beaten at 4 p.m.-and at midnight I knew with still greater certainty that he was absolutely beaten…’ Commodore Roger Keyes the Dardanelles 18 March 1915.
The British general staff had been looking at some way to bypass the deadlock on the 350 miles of the Western Front from the North Sea to the Swiss Alps, even before 1914 came to an end. A flanking move was considered through Turkey and the Balkans, or even through the Baltic. Although the French were opposed to any drain on manpower from the Western Front. However in December 1914 the Grand Duke Nicholas, commander-in-chief of the Russian Armies had approached Field Marshal Kitchener head of Imperial General Staff asking for a demonstration against the Turks somewhere, to ease the pressure they were applying against the Russians in the Caucasus. After the heavy losses they had suffered at Tannenberg their armies were beginning to show the strain. Russia had by that time suffered a million casualties and basic supplies like footwear and rifles and ammunition were running out.
Kitchener personally took the news to the Admiralty to discuss what they might do with Winston Churchill the forty-year-old First Lord. They both agreed a message should be sent to the Grand Duke that: ‘Steps will be taken to make a demonstration against the Turks.’ Churchill had brought Jacky Fisher back to the Admiralty in October 1914 as his right hand man. Fisher was enthusiastic at first outlining Indian troops and 75,000 from France along with parts of the Egyptian garrison should be landed on the Asiatic side of the Dardanelles. While old battleships that were expendable should force their way through the Gallipoli Narrows and that pressure should be applied to the Greeks and Bulgarians to join in. However Kitchener was against any troops being taken from the Western Front.
The demonstration would have to be a naval affair. Churchill was particularly taken with Fisher’s forcing the straits with old battleships idea. There was the example of Admiral Duckworth who passed through the straits in 1807. Taking seven ships of the line when the Russians had asked for similar assistance against Napoleon, he overwhelmed the Turkish batteries and destroyed a squadron in the Sea of Marmara. Then the wind failed and he was unable to bombard Constantinople he waited a week and then retired. The return was more difficult but no ships were lost although the Turkish gunners inflicted some 150 casualties among the ships crews. With no reliance on the wind modern steam ships, so the argument went, could surely emulate Duckworth’s achievement.
Churchill approached the man on the spot Vice-Admiral Sackville Carden who commanded the squadron in the eastern Mediterranean: ‘Do you consider the forcing of the Dardanelles by ships alone a practical operation?’ He also added old battleships would be used and mine sweepers with the proviso: ‘Importance of results would justify severe loss.’ Fisher approved the telegram before it was sent.
Carden’s reply: ‘I do not consider the forcing of the Dardanelles can be rushed. They might be forced by extended operations with a large number of ships.’ Carden was then asked to supply a plan. In early January it arrived, it required a large fleet 12 battleships, 3 battle cruisers and scores of other vessels including minesweepers.
The plan was discussed at the Admiralty on 13 January Churchill outlined the plan with large maps. Fisher, Admiral of the Fleet Arthur Wilson and Kitchener were present. According to the minutes there were no dissenters so it was approved: ‘That the Admiralty should prepare for a naval expedition in February to bombard and take the Gallipoli Peninsula with Constantinople as its objective.’ It is odd that nobody, at the time, seemed to question how a fleet was supposed to take a peninsula or for that matter what it could do against a city. Yet it was true that Turkey was unstable and had suffered two revolutions in five years and such a move might tip it over the edge away from the Central Powers. Kitchener was happy that few of his soldiers would be involved. The Russians talked of sending troops, and the French offered four battleships and their escorts. By the end of the month shipping was beginning to gather in the Mediterranean.
Fisher soon began to have doubts over the effect on the Grand Fleet. It came to a head on 25 January in a letter to Churchill he wrote in his opinion it was wrong to send ships on such an operation without military support. The loss of old ships might be acceptable but risking the loss of the crews could not be justified. However the War Cabinet and Prime Minister Asquith approved the operation. In a private meeting with Churchill, Fisher at last agreed to support the operation. He even recommended adding two more battleships to the fleet.
The choices of commanders to lead this bold stroke were not the energetic men it required. Carden was already in poor health. His second-in-command Vice-Admiral Sir John de Robeck was a traditional naval officer who had reservations about the operation without military support. However the Chief of-the-Naval Staff in the Dardanelles was the energetic Commodore Roger Keyes who was totally behind Churchill’s concept.
The attack on the outer forts began on 19 February. Three days before Carden and his staff embarked on the battleship Albion at Malta for the Dardanelles. Arriving at Tenedos on the 18th Carden switched his flag to the battle cruiser Inflexible. Orders were issued for the next day, which consisted of the fleet engaging the outer Forts of the narrows at ranges beyond the Turkish guns. The fleet had some 140 the biggest of which were 8 15inch on the new battleship Queen Elizabeth.
The bombardment began about 10 a.m. and continued for four hours. The ships then moved in closer and maintained their fire. At 4 p.m. with the enemy guns still silent two battleships were sent in to close range, the forts now returned fire, but these ships soon silenced those guns. With the sun setting Carden ordered the recall and the ships returned to Tenedos.
The day’s experience demonstrated the fleet might be able to run the narrows. However if the Turks did not immediately sue for peace, to keep the straits open would require a landing party.
This point had been raised in London and two battalions of Royal Marines Infantry from the Royal Naval Division were on their way. Their task along with shore parties from the ships would be to destroy the guns in the forts once they had been silenced by the fleet. Reluctantly Kitchener agreed to troops being sent from France but when the French complained he cancelled the order. Instead he agreed to 30,000 Australian and New Zealand troops then in Egypt to be assigned to assist the navy. The French were also willing to commit 18,000 of their colonial troops to the enterprise.
My maternal Grandfather a Royal Marine was serving aboard the battleship HMS Ocean fifth of the Canopus class of ships at the time. He had served in the Royal Marines for ten years from 1897-1907. After this in 1910 he went into the Royal Fleet Reserve. On 3 August 1914, with war looming, he was called up and joined Ocean. A month later the battleship sailed from Plymouth for the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. After a spell as flagship of the C-in-C East Indies she passed back through the Suez Canal and by the end of February 1915 was off the Dardanelles.
The bombardment of the outer forts of 19 February was not followed up by a closer assault to engage individual Turkish batteries or even guns, because the weather turned bad with rough seas and sleet and snow reducing visibility for five days. Carden reassured London: ‘I do not intend to commence in bad weather leaving result undecided as from experience on the first day I am convinced given favourable weather conditions that the reduction of the forts at the entrance can be completed in one day.’
With better weather on 25 February Vice-Admiral de Robeck in Vengeance led the attack right into the mouth of the straits. The Turkish forces withdrew. During the next few days landing parties of Marines and Sailors went ashore blowing up abandoned guns and fortifications. There were only two clashes with Turkish soldiers but mostly they found the country around Cape Helles and Kum Kale deserted. The minesweepers, mostly converted civilian trawlers with civilian crews, had some difficulty against the strong currents but they got into the straits and found no mines. Turkish mobile guns managed to hit some British warships but none were lost or even seriously damaged.
On 2 March Carden signalled the Admiralty to tell them of a good spell of fine weather and he hoped to get through to Constantinople in 14 days. However ominously difficulties began to appear, the Turks began to return to Kum Kale and Cape Helles driving off the small British landing parties.
Henry Denham, a midshipman at the time on the battleship Agamemnon wrote in his celebrated diary on Monday 1 March: ‘The Vengeance [landing] party which had landed at Kum Kale had great difficulties on account of the Turkish snipers attacking them all the time. Germans were actually seen among the snipers; three of the party were injured…’
The Turks also got more success with their mobile guns, constantly moving position and firing a few shots before moving again, frustrated the ships gunners. Their fire hardly affected the battleships but it did the minesweepers that were now coming across mines. If the mines could not be cleared the heavy ships could not pass through the straits or get close enough to silence the Turkish guns of the inner forts.
Roger Keyes went forward with the minesweepers covered by the Canopus on 10 March as they approached the straits they were lit up by searchlights the battleship opened fire: ‘We were fired at from all directions….’ By all sorts of weapons up to six inch guns: ‘The fire was very wild, and Canopus was not hit, but for all the good we did toward dowsing the searchlights we might just as well have been firing at the Moon.’ They tried again the next night without battleship cover. But the civilian crewed ‘sweepers turned tail and fled directly they were fired upon.’ He was furious especially as none of them had been hit. The crews were changed for naval personnel and on 13 March they returned, of the seven minesweepers four were put out of action by Turkish fire, however many mines had their cables cut and were swept away by the current the next day and were picked off by rifle fire exploding harmlessly. It was decided sweeping would now be conducted in daylight and the fleet would launch a full-scale attack on the narrows on 17 or 18 March.
The strain of command had told on Carden he could not eat or sleep and was under constant pressure from London. It took him on average two days to reply to Churchill’s messages. He did not lose faith in the mission but rather in himself to command it. On 15 March he told Keyes he could not continue in command. Both de Robeck and Keyes tried to change his mind pointing out it would be the end of his career. Examined by a senior doctor serving with the fleet he advised Carden was on the verge of nervous collapse and needed complete rest. De Robeck was approved to take over command on 17 March. Churchill told him to use his own judgement but if he felt ‘the immediate operations proposed are wise and practicable. If not, do not hesitate to say so. If so, execute them without delay and without further reference at the first favourable opportunity……All good fortune attend you.’
De Robeck replied weather permitting he would launch the full-scale attack the next day.
18 March 1915
The morning of 18 March was warm and sunny, soon after first light De Robeck who had moved his flag to the new battleship Queen Elizabeth ordered the fleet to clear for action. At action stations the ships sailed from the Tenedos anchorage.
Sixteen battleships in three divisions were to attack the narrows. The plan was the battleships would destroy the forts and minesweepers would clear the narrows allowing the fleet to pass through. About 11 a.m. the first division, including Queen Elizabeth reached its station, a point eight miles south of the narrows where they steamed, the current remaining stationary and fired on the forts. The flag ship’s targets were two forts either side of the town of Chanak engaging them with her main armament. While Agamemnon, Lord Nelson, and Inflexible engaged three other forts at Kilid Bahr on the opposite bank.
Henry Denham wrote in his diary that day about the Turkish return fire from concealed batteries whereas the big Forts were not firing: ‘At 12.22 salvos of three or four shots 50 yds off our port beam continue to fall now all around us, probably from 8-inch howitzers which we could not locate; they burst on striking the water very close, making the ship shake like blazes.’ Denham was in one of the secondary 9.2 inch gun turrets, when he felt the after 12 inch gun turret ‘lifted clean off its seating and shock everyone inside. More shots hit us; shell burst just outside our turret, saw all the flash inside and much noise; it must have been a high-explosive shell. At 1.06, shot hit the conning-tower, others close, but we now cleared out of range and as shots fell astern of us they started to practice on Lord Nelson.’
Around midday de Robeck ordered the French squadron forward to engage the narrows at shorter range. Admiral Emile Guepratte took his old battleships in closer to the enemy guns where they fanned out so as not to obscure the British field of fire from astern of them. For three-quarters of an hour a tremendous exchange of fire took place. Gaulois was hit below the waterline, while Inflexible had a hole in her starboard side and Agamemnon had been hit twelve times. Yet there were less than a dozen casualties in the fleet and the fire from the shore was slackening by about 1.45 p.m. the Turkish fire had practically stopped.
De Robeck now ordered the French ships to retire to replace them with third division. About 2 p.m. the Suffren turned to starboard leading the French ships along the Asiatic shore. The Bouvet following the Suffren was shaken by a huge explosion and within minutes sank by the stern. Most of the crew, 639 men, went down with the ship. Denham thought she went down ‘in about one and a half – two minutes’ 64 men were picked up.
Moving in pairs the third division, Ocean and Irresistible, Albion and Vengeance, Swiftsure and Majestic came into close range pounding the forts. Meanwhile the Inflexible, which had been in action all day, took a heavy list to starboard like Bouvet, she was a victim of another mine but did not sink she returned to Malta for repairs.
Next Irresistible struck a mine. Signalman Eric Peacock was at his action station in the fire control at the foretop, high on the foremast when he heard an ‘awful crunch’ and ‘the ship shuddered and began to list to starboard.’ To him high on the mast ‘it seemed quite a bit.’ Within minutes the order came to abandon ship. Peacock was more worried about a new pair of boots slung around his neck as he entered the water. He was soon picked up and was taken to Queen Elizabeth but had lost his boots.
Although the area had been swept for mines frequently before 18 March, a Turkish steamer the Nusret, on the night of 8 March had laid twenty mines in Eren Keui Bay on the Asiatic shore. It was here the Allied ships were turning to head back out to sea. This little field had somehow been missed and was causing all the trouble.
About 5 p.m. de Robeck broke off the action which had started so well, a controversial decision to this day.With three battleships out of action and another sunk we might sympathise with him. Irresistible remained afloat drifting toward the Asiatic shore, the executive officer and ten men had stayed on board to make the ship ready for towing. Keyes was ordered to take the destroyer Wear which had picked up a lot of the crew of the stricken ship, back to salvage the Irresistible while Ocean and Swiftsure would lead assistance.
Keyes reached Irresistible about 5.20 which was under heavy Turkish fire and the salvage party had already left. Nevertheless he felt he should attempt to save the ship and signalled Ocean to take her in tow. Ocean replied the water was not deep enough. Keyes took Wear in closer testing the depth the destroyer came under heavy fire, they could even see the Turkish gunners working their guns. Even so they found fifteen fathoms of water a half a mile inshore of Irresistible again he signalled Ocean which was ignored. Ocean and Swiftsure were steaming up and down blazing away at the Asiatic shore which Keyes felt was doing no good whatsoever. He signalled Ocean again: ‘If you do not propose to take the Irresistible in tow the Admiral wishes you to withdraw.’ Again there was no reply. Keyes took Wear closer to Ocean when a violent explosion shook the battleship and she began to list.
Marine Private Henry Wilcox onboard Ocean takes up the story shortly after they hit a mine while approaching Irresistible: ‘Our engines were put out of action, so we were stuck there helpless, with shells coming over pretty thick. We got the order to abandon ship. Several destroyers came in to take the crew off.’
Colour Sergeant Frederick Stapleton got off Ocean as she began to list heavily. ‘I then slid down the rope until my feet rested on some bridge rails (on the destroyer) where I had to balance myself for a few seconds until it was possible to squeeze a foothold on the deck.’
Marine Wilcox recalled: ‘As we were leaving Ocean she was heeling over, and coming along the deck was a sick berth attendant with two wounded men one on each side of him a brave act, but no notice taken of it.’
Keyes returned to Queen Elizabeth which was just outside the straits there he saw de Robeck also with the admiral were the captains of Irresistible and Ocean. A heated discussion took place in which Keyes voiced his views about the failure to salvage Irresistible. De Robeck remained calm seemingly undismayed by the latest disaster, his one concern was that Keyes had something to eat before he went back to the straits. Keyes planned to try and salvage either ship if they were still afloat, or if they could not to sink them with torpedoes. He set off for the straits in one of Queen Elizabeth’s cutters after a short time he boarded the destroyer Jed and in the dark tried to find the stricken ships. For four hours they searched but there was no sign of either ship. Keyes concluded they must have sunk in deep water. It was about this time Keyes later wrote: ‘I had a most indelible impression that we were in the presence of a beaten foe.’
Returning to the flag ship Keyes found de Robeck still awake in his cabin, gone was the calm man of a few hours ago he was agitated about ‘losing so many ships’ and he would ‘find myself superseded tomorrow morning.’ Keyes soon cheered him up, they would re-organise the minesweepers make them more efficient, and losses had been expected. The next day de Robeck signalled the Admiralty on an optimistic note, the fleet was ready to resume the attack, but in view of the danger of floating mines plans needed to be adopted to deal with them. The reply from the Admiralty was positive urging him to renew the attack and that losses were to be expected. Four more battleships would be sent out and the French would replace the Bouvet with the Henri IV.
By 20 March de Robeck could report that fifty British and twelve French minesweepers would soon be available crewed by naval personnel. Also more aircraft were on their way to help with fire control and spotting.
However General Sir Ian Hamilton who had been given command of the troops now beginning to assemble at Lemnos arrived to inspect 2,000 Royal Marines and 4,000 Australian and New Zealand soldiers. He was not of the opinion the navy could force the straits alone. On 19 March he sent a message to Kitchener to that effect feeling it would require: ‘a deliberate and prepared military operation, carried out at full strength, so as to gain passage for the navy.’
On 22 March a conference was held on Queen Elizabeth at which Keyes was not present being occupied with planning for the new assault. Hamilton and Major-General William Birdwood commander of the ANZAC’s were there de Robeck and Admiral Rosslyn Wemyss the Lemnos base commander. It is unclear if Hamilton persuaded de Robeck to give up the naval attack or if the Admiral felt the army should have a bigger role. One thing is certain de Robeck did feel the army was needed to land at Bulair at the neck of the peninsula once the navy was into the Sea of Marmara, thus the Turkish forces at Gallipoli would be cut off. Then communications through the straits would be secure. Hamilton felt this to be impracticable and it would be better for the army to land at the tip of the peninsula and fight his way up it. Yet there was danger in delaying the naval attack for it gave the Turks time to repair and reinforce their defences.
Once Keyes learnt of the outcome of the meeting he insisted that he and de Robeck meet Hamilton again. With another spell of bad weather having set in reluctantly Keyes agreed to cancel the naval assault and wait for the army to land and embark on a combined operation.
On the other side of the hill the Turks had expected the Allied Fleet to renew the attack on the 19th. They were almost out of ammunition and there were few mines left and no replacements anywhere near. Even the Turkish Government had contingency plans to abandon Constantinople. Only Keyes and Churchill seemed to have divined this was the case. The Turkish General Staff in the 1920’s admitted that a renewal of the attack on 19 March would likely have been decisive.
The Royal Navy War College study concluded: ‘The Dardanelles naval assault of 18 March 1915 revealed numerous flaws throughout the British war apparatus at all levels, military, and civilian, tactical, operational and strategic. In retrospect, a daring tactical concept with immense strategic import not just failed, but actually brought about a situation that it was meant to avoid in the first place, that being a massive commitment of forces and resultant heavy casualties.’
My Grandfather an Ocean survivor was transferred to HMS Ark Royal on which he would remain until September 1915. A collier originally she was the first of the Royal Navy’s aircraft carriers, operating float planes. Midshipman Denham wrote in his diary that she was: ‘An ugly converted steamer with a launching ramp built over the bows she seemed to carry a motley collection of aircraft.’
In September Grandfather joined the old light cruiser HMS Edgar he continued to serve throughout the Gallipoli campaign which ended with British evacuation in January 1916. He did not return to the UK until July 1917.
Forty-one Victoria crosses were awarded for the Gallipoli campaign. British Army units received eighteen. Six were awarded to members of the 1st Battalion the Lancashire Fusiliers on 25 April when they landed at Cape Helles into withering Turkish fire. Twelve were awarded to members of the Royal Navy, four to midshipmen on board the River Clyde duringthelanding on V beach Cape Helles on 25 April. Australians were awarded ten and one to a New Zealand soldier. Allied dead amounted to 50,133 while Turkey had 86,692 killed.
Plans were made for a Gallipoli campaign medal for all who had fought there. It got as far as the production of ribbon, which combined Navy blue, red for the Army, yellow for the Australians and grey-green for New Zealand however the medal was never issued. The King George V forbade it. ‘We do not’ he was supposed to have said ‘issue medals for retreats.’ Such was the controversial legacy of Gallipoli.
France awarded a Dardanelles Campaign Medal after public pressure which was established in June 1926 and called the ‘Orient and Dardanelles Campaign Medal.’ In bronze on the relief is the image of a female helmeted warrior above the head are laurel leaves and the words Republique Francaise. On the reverse are crossed an anchor and rifle below two crossed military banners with the inscription ‘Dardanelles’ the ribbon is green and white.
Fifty years after the campaign the Australian Government issued the ANZAC Medal to veterans of the Gallipoli campaign. One side bears the map of Australia and New Zealand and the Southern Cross, the other a bas-relief of the legendary figure of Private John Simpson Kirkpatrick 3rd Field Ambulance and his donkey. A fireman in civilian life after the Anzac landing he carried wounded men down Shrapnel Gully to the dressing station on the beach. On the return journey to the front he would carry water to the troops. After a few days he found a donkey in the gully and the two became inseparable. Day and night he continued for three weeks until on 19 May he was shot dead by a sniper.